Thai foreign policy needs new rudder

Thailand’s foreign policy posture and projection under Foreign Minister Maris Sangiampongsa and the new government of Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra is off to a good start under severe structural constraints. Given the widespread consensus both at home and abroad that Thailand has fallen behind its peers over the past two decades, the imperative of regaining its international standing is undisputed. But doing so under what the foreign minister has outlined as a “neutral stance” under “non-alignment” among the great powers is moot and misguided. What Thai foreign policy needs is multi-alignments and omni-directionality under a new rudder.
First, Mr Maris should be credited for his public accessibility and accountability, unlike his predecessor under the military-backed regime of Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha. The foreign minister, a career diplomat who remains in the same post under the Paetongtarn government after the preceding Srettha Thavisin administration was removed by the Constitutional Court last month, has already held several rounds of regular “meet the press” sessions. Widely known as a loyalist of Thaksin Shinawatra, the powerbroker and founder of the ruling Pheu Thai Party and father of the prime minister, Mr Maris will need to demonstrate a sufficient degree of autonomy in policymaking and diplomacy to come into his own and to cultivate international stature and regional acceptance to make his way.
It has been difficult for Thailand to move on the global stage in any forward direction when its elected government is constantly being sabotaged. The election results in May 2023 were subverted so that the biggest winner, the Move Forward Party, and its up-to-date policy platform and ambition for Thailand’s “middle power” status were upended. Mr Srettha’s one year in office was a diplomatic waste, having made progress on Myanmar policy and foreign policy forays in multiple directions yet succumbing to unelected forces.
Ms Paetongtarn now faces similar charges from similar saboteurs who keep filing court petitions to keep the government off balance. Thailand’s structural constraints are characterised by the systemic weakening of the executive branch and division and co-option of the legislature, buttressed by entrenched elites who don’t necessarily like what is happening but hold too many vested interests to change it. These structural impediments have held Thailand back for two decades in all domains, from political reform and economic upgrading to educational progress and social reconciliation.
Thai foreign policy is thus challenged by these structural issues. What Mr Maris has delineated as “diplomacy for the people” and “proactive economic diplomacy” harks back two decades when Mr Thaksin was still in power before being overthrown by a military coup in 2006. Back then, it was known as “people-centred diplomacy”, while commercial policy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was operationalised under the “CEO ambassador” concept. Although many countries have long practised economic diplomacy and ran trade and investment policies out of their embassies, Thailand’s first encounter mixing traditional diplomacy with trade was disastrous. Back then, senior diplomats resented being commercial agents as they prided themselves as representatives of their sovereign. Mr Thaksin was partly overthrown for trying to modernise Thai diplomacy.
Now, diplomacy that people can relate to and the foreign policy pursuit of economic interests are back. They should be welcomed, but putting words into action and ideas into practice will be the real test. For example, the free-trade negotiations under the Thai-European Union Comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) are still unfinished after a long pause following another military coup in 2014. This Thai-EU free-trade agreement can usher in the myriad economic and structural reforms Thailand sorely needs. But the domestic bargaining and negotiating trade-offs with big Thai firms have yet to occur.
A similar but smaller and, therefore, more manageable trade deal between Thailand and the European Free Trade Association also remains incomplete despite entering the final stages. The Thai-EFTA free-trade deal yields benefits beyond trade. It can provide economic policy momentum and signify that Thailand is back in the global economic arena. Those who view FTAs as foreign meddling and unequal treaties should know that the world is going in this direction, either bilateral, regional (eg Asean Economic Community) or plurilateral (like the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). Vietnam, for instance, has had a comparable free-trade agreement with the EU since 2019, and Vietnam and Malaysia are members of both the CPTPP and RCEP.
If Mr Maris can weave Thai “soft power” into proactive economic diplomacy, it would be even better. His highlighting of the lower ends of diplomacy, such as cross-border drug and human trafficking, water management, scam call centres, PM2.5 pollution, and transnational crimes, are steps in the right direction. Yet what will matter most are the higher priorities on Thailand’s foreign policy agenda.
The foreign minister was spot-on to stress Myanmar as Thailand’s top foreign and security policy concern. Like the previous Srettha government, Mr Maris wants Thailand to play a leading role in resolving Myanmar’s civil war and taking part in what happens next in the warn-torn neighbour next door. Again, operationalising this aim is key. Mr Maris would do well to pick up where his predecessor, former Foreign Minister Parnpree Bahiddha-nukara, left off. Mr Parnpree was able to engage with all sides, opened up humanitarian assistance channels, and crucially gained the trust of the resistance coalition that is winning the civil war against the military junta that seized power in February 2021. What Mr Maris must avoid are the pro-junta efforts put up by his other predecessor, former Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai.
What will matter most is the high politics of international diplomacy and Thailand’s broad geostrategic approach. For Thailand, a United States treaty ally with intimate ties to China, non-alignment is naïve, while neutrality sounds nice but is misplaced. In the intensifying torrents of geostrategic competition and conflict the world over, Thailand needs to multi-align with the major powers and go omnidirectional globally.
Harnessing close and unrivalled relations with the major powers is the cornerstone of Thailand’s moving multi-alignment, and it would be all the better if this country could again harbour a “middle power” aspiration. The last time Thailand was seen as a potential middle power was 20 years ago. It’s time to be bold with some self-belief again despite structural agents of tradition and backwardness who want to hold the country back.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, PhD, is professor at the Faculty of Political Science and a senior fellow at its Institute of Security and International Studies in Bangkok.